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1. INTRODUCTION 
Market transparency has long been and remains a major concern when it comes to 
qualifying the efficiency of markets. In agriculture, the increasingly complex food chains 
and the related multiplication of intermediate links make this issue highly sensitive, 
particularly among producers and policy-makers. Recent reports and discussions in the 
European Union about potential Unfair Trading Practices (e.g., AMTF, 2016; Falkowski et 
al., 2017; EC, 2018) pointed out the risk that some parties may take unjustified 
advantages of opacity in these organizational arrangements. Market transparency also 
raises other important issues, inter alia the capacity of analysis by operators for a better 
planning of their investment and production decisions, by policy-makers for designing 
appropriate policy responses, and by researchers for a better understanding of market 
developments and more appropriate assessment of policy designs. 
Responding to these concerns, a workshop was held in Brussels on May 30-31, 20181, 
with the assignment “to assess the scope and nature of possible EU action aimed at 
improving the functioning of sectoral food chains through increased market 
transparency.” The dense presentations and debates of these two days, with participation 
of a diversified crowd of operators, members of the academia, and policy-makers 
suggested that beyond some clear benefits to be expected of more transparency the 
difficulties and costs of extending the scope of information required and possible 
drawbacks of more transparency should also be taken into consideration. Participants 
thus raised the challenging question: up to what point should resources be devoted to 
increase market transparency? 
The background that motivated these discussions is twofold. On the one hand there is 
the coming revision of the European ‘Common Agricultural Policy’. On the other hand, 
there are problems to which the ongoing policy has been confronted over the recent 
years, with the development of complex supply chain systems paired with significant 
price volatility, at least for some agricultural products, as illustrated in many 
contributions to the workshop. Variations in the price for milk deliveries provide a vivid 
and politically sensitive example of the amplitude of these variations, with significant 
divergences about how to interpret … and correct these variations. 
                                           
1 This paper is based on the presentations and discussions at this workshop. Names followed by a number in 
brackets refer to the slides delivered by the contributors and listed at the end of this paper in the order of their 
presentation. Quotations from these slides are indicated as such. I would like to thank Bruno Buffaria, Pavel 
Ciaian, Germain Gaudin, Federica di Marcantoni, and two anonymous referees from the DG AGRI for their very 
useful comments on a first draft of this report. The usual disclaimer fully applies 
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Figure 1: Average payment for milk deliveries, EU, France, Italy, 2009-2016 
 
Source: Brooks (1) 
Bicknell (10) went even further, showing that the price cycle for Britain dairy milk has 
evolved towards increased volatility, more exactly larger fluctuations, over the last ten 
years.  
Figure 2: Price cycle in the British dairy milk 
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Source: Bicknell (10) 
And McCorriston (4) reinforced these examples with the case of cereals and related 
products. 
Figure 3: Price fluctuations for cereals and related products 
 
Source: McCorriston (4) 
Of course, price volatility is not a novel concern in the agri-food sector. It has long been 
observed and discussed (see already Coase and Fowler (1935) on the pig-cycle) and has 
been at the origin of many different policies, from the creation of marketing boards in the 
1930s to the recent reliance on a contractual approach. With the development of supply 
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chain systems, part of the explanation has turned to the opacity that would result from 
these organizational arrangements and the room it would open to unfair trading practices 
(Falkowski et al., 2017).  
It is in this context that market transparency is promoted as the appropriate answer to 
volatility as well as to unfair trading practices. However, ‘market transparency’ can also 
be a catch-all expression diverting attention from other factors or even creating problems 
of its own. Introducing preliminary results of an open public consultation and 
notwithstanding the acknowledged limits of the exercise, Marcelo Lima (0) captured 
facets of this ambiguity. The consultation confirmed a strong demand for more 
transparency among actors of the civil society and the agricultural sector. This is a 
powerful signal, even more so since responses from respondents involved in farming 
converged with those not involved. At the same time, much less enthusiasm was 
expressed by retailers and respondents from the agri-food industry. Arguments on both 
sides were developed during the workshop and deserve consideration.  
Ambiguities also showed up through questions about what to expect from transparency, 
with compatibility, completeness, accuracy and timeliness of information being the most 
valued items, although not necessarily easy to combine. There was even more dramatic 
polarization of answers, for example to the question of whether there should be “an EU-
level obligation for operators along the supply chain to report on prices.” Although the 
vast majority of respondents supported this proposition, none of the participating 
retailers agreed. The same gap was observable in answers to a question regarding more 
specifically transparency in prices. These discrepancies need careful interpretation, 
because they show that ‘market transparency’ is not always obvious in both its content 
and modalities. 
Bruno Buffaria and Tassos Haniotis delivered introductory remarks that clearly set the 
stage for the analysis of these paradoxes and puzzles. They identified four questions that 
should be considered when promoting ‘market transparency’: (1) What is Market 
Transparency? (2) Why to target Market Transparency? (3) How to improve Market 
Transparency? (4) Which impact can be expected from Market Transparency? In what 
follows, I summarize and discuss the contributions and debates that animated the 
workshop along these very central questions. Section 2 discusses the complex items 
enclosed in the idea of ‘market transparency’. Section 3 examines different motivations 
for and potential beneficiaries from more market transparency. Section 4 points out some 
costs of extending the set of information needed to improve market transparency and 
considers alternative ways to collect and diffuse such information. Section 5 looks at the 
possible impact of more transparency and the potential role of new technologies in that 
respect. Section 6 concludes with a view at some recommendations that can be drawn 
for policy-makers facing the challenges raised by the target of more transparent markets.  
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2. WHAT IS MARKET TRANSPARENCY ABOUT?  
‘Market transparency’ can be a catch-all expression. It may refer to so many issues that 
the expression becomes a stereotype, concealing the exact nature of problems at stake. 
As Hanrahan (11) ironized, citing the otherwise very stimulating Agricultural Markets 
Task Force report (2016), market transparency refers to the “Availability of relevant 
market information to market participants,” which sounds quite tautological. A short 
review of the dimensions of ‘market transparency’ pointed out through the presentations 
and discussions of the workshop already suggests the richness and complexity of the 
issues debated.  
2.1: General idea: the complexity of market arrangements matters 
In the public consultation initiated by the DG-AGRI, the following definition was 
submitted to the potential respondents: “For the purpose of this questionnaire, market 
transparency refers to the public availability of relevant information (prices in particular, 
but also weather, production, trade, consumption and utilisation, stocks, costs) for all 
market participants throughout the food supply chain.” (Lima, 0) 
This is quite a broad definition. Actually, in most documents on market transparency as 
well as in the DG questionnaire and in many presentations to the workshop, the standard 
economic approach tends to prevail, with ‘transparency’ largely identified to the key role 
of price as carrier of the strategic information needed by participants to the market.  
However, the very concept of market encompasses more dimensions. Markets are about 
transactions and the modalities of organizing them. In that respect, knowing these 
modalities (e.g., market structures, arrangements like supply chains) as well as the 
institutional factors influencing these modalities (e.g., agricultural policies) are crucial 
information. A potential obstacle to transparency is that the full completion of a 
transaction often requires going through different steps involving different organizational 
modalities. For example, Brooks (1) remarked that information available on agricultural 
markets make them relatively transparent because they are highly competitive while 
food markets are much less transparent because they are markets with high 
concentration ratio and involve information along intermediate steps of the supply chain 
that remain into private hands and are hardly accessible.  
The case of the Poland market for pig developed by Latkowska (7) illustrates well this 
point. Reviewing the information collected on that market, she noted that 
notwithstanding a strong demand for information on price transmission/transformation 
along the supply chain, this demand is very difficult to satisfy. Looking at the Irish beef 
market, Hanrahan (11) pushed further the examination of the obstacles to transparency 
coming out of the existence of different nodes along the supply chain through which a 
transaction is processed. He pointed out that we need to take into account different and 
well-identifiable market ‘steps’, from cattle raising to retail and food markets and/or 
export markets. And he emphasized that quite detailed and frequently updated 
“information” is available on the physical characteristics and prices of beef at the 
farm/cattle market(s) level, while there are much less public data available at the retail 
level, with information basically limited to prices, and with even less data on 
processing/wholesale supply chain stages. In other terms, there are large discrepancies 
for “Differing levels of market information available to market participants at different 
sub-markets”.  
The increasing scarcity of data on volume and costs when we move down the 
intermediate steps of the supply chain is an observation made by numerous participants. 
It concurs with the Agricultural Markets Task Force report (2016), which pinpointed the 
poor information available at the meat processing/wholesale and retail market levels, an 
issue also raised by Gardebroek (12) in his overview of data collection in the food sector. 
A first message can be drawn from these indications: 
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Message # 1: The quality and density of information available varies quite 
significantly depending on the stages along the supply chains, and is 
particularly scarce when it comes to the intermediate nodes (or steps) 
between the polar stages of farming and end-retailing.  
Discussions largely supported the view that more information is needed throughout the 
different steps along supply chains. 
2.2: What is transparency about? 
Like the notion of ‘market’, the idea of transparency is all but … transparent! 
Economists and, by contiguity, policy-makers now ritually tend to identify transparency 
with the availability of information on prices in market transactions. This approach goes 
back to the famous paper from Hayek (1945) according to which the comparative 
advantage of market economies lies precisely on the availability of information carried 
through prices. Prices would reveal the preferences of users, thus sending appropriate 
signals to suppliers so they can meet the resulting demand. However, there are many 
problems underlying this apparently simple statement. Beside the question of whether 
knowing prices is enough (see section 2.3), there are conditions for prices to play their 
role as vector of transparency: the information they carry must be available, reliable, and 
…useful  
Availability of information is a key condition for the efficient running of market 
economies, and it has been at the centre of attention of analysts as well as policy-
makers. Collecting, ordering and diffusing information is central for the price mechanism 
to fully play its function, providing support to the fluidity of transactions. However, an 
important issue discussed in the workshop (see 2.3) is: what information must be 
available? Made available to whom? And what level of details is required?  
Of course, availability is not enough. When we talk about availability we implicitly 
assume that information thus collected is reliable. However, fulfilling this condition is 
not obvious: it has been a major source of complaint from different parties to the 
increasingly complex (and often opaque) organization of transactions in supply chain 
systems. A previous workshop organized by DG-AGRI and the JRC (Falkowski et al., 
2017) focused on the existence of “unfair trading practices”, a major cause of distorted 
information. The  workshop on ‘Market Transparency’ intended to go further, with the 
specific task of assessing more general conditions under which transparency on markets 
in which supply chains play a key role could increase efficiency and fairness to all parties. 
This aspect introduces another dimension to the issue of transparency: beyond 
information provided by prices, organizational arrangements structuring the market 
matter! As pointed out by Fausti (9), concentration at different levels of the supply chain 
might reduce the information available and challenge its reliability. In his words, 
“thinning markets reduces the accuracy of price discovery,” a point he illustrated with 
data from USDA about the rapid and high level of concentration (as measured through 
CR 4) in steel and heilfer slaughtering, boxed beef production, and to a lower extent hogs 
slaughtering. Concentration, particularly when it happens at the retailing level, also goes 
hand-in-hand with the development of extended and complex supply chains that might 
increase the lack of transparency … or the perception that there is a lack of transparency. 
The public consultation of the DG-AGRI (Lima, 0) showed how important this perception 
is, not without factual support. For example, data collection through the so-called 
Georgia Dock Index in the US poultry industry revealed how concentration might greatly 
influence not only the modalities through which information is collected (more on this 
below), but also its reliability (Bates, 2). 
The third condition, usefulness, has also different dimensions. As already pointed out by 
Hayek, the capacity of transactors to process and transform available information into 
knowledge is crucial. Brooks (1) indirectly pinpointed this issue when he noted that: 
“Transparency reflects the ease with which information is available.”  ‘Ease’ can be 
understood as referring to the capacity for market participants to access and process 
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information in order to appropriately decide and monitor transactions. This aspect 
suggests another dimension of usefulness: timeliness. Indeed, the delivery of reliable 
information on time is crucial and varies depending on the approach and purpose that 
information is used for. Several discussants pointed out this issue (see also Arbia et al., 
13; and Ciaian, 14). The usefulness condition might be particularly acute in supply 
chains. Indeed, timeliness also concerns the sensitive issue of the potential asymmetry in 
access and usage among interdependent parties. As noted by many contributors, a lot of 
attention has been devoted so far to availability of information on prices. A key challenge 
might well be the limited and poor usage of information already available. 
In the continuation of the discussions and debates on ‘unfair trading practices’ (Falkowski 
et al., 2017), these remarks suggest:  
Message # 2: Transparency is multi-dimensional. It refers to information 
that combines complex knowledge with potential sources of asymmetry 
among parties, making even more crucial conditions of availability, 
reliability, and usefulness (including timeliness) for all parties to 
transactions. 
2.3: What information makes markets ‘transparent’? 
Underlying the discussions reported above, there was clearly a central issue that fed 
heated debates: what information other than prices paid to producers or by consumers is 
needed to make transactions transparent in complex market structures. Such 
supplement of information is asked for by transactors as well as policy-makers. The hot 
question is of course: which extra information should be made available?    
As already mentioned, economists have long emphasized and often still stick to the idea 
that price is all that is needed. Following this logic, the problem with supply chains is the 
missing information on prices at intermediate steps, so that this is where the effort 
should go. However, several contributors and discussants pointed out that volatility of 
prices in the agricultural sector indicates the need for a wider set of information. As 
rightly emphasized by Bicknell (10), referring to his experience with the dairy milk 
industry in Great Britain, what matters for partners to face price volatility is the 
availability and knowledge of costs and their distribution along the supply chain. This 
request largely remains a good wish. When it comes to agriculture and the agri-food 
sector, very few countries go beyond collecting information on price at the farm gate or 
at the end-consumer’s level. In the European Union only France and Spain collect data 
allowing “comparison of prices and costs at stages of the supply chain” (Brooks (1), his 
emphasis). 
A good illustration of the benign neglect of non-price information and its consequences 
was provided and discussed through the example of the pig meat sector, a major market 
in Poland (Latkowska, 7). Data made available are almost exclusively about prices: 
purchase prices of pig carcasses according to SEUROP classification; prices of piglets on 
marketplaces; selling prices of pig carcasses, loins (middle part) bone-in, processed 
products (cooked ham and a specific popular sausage (toruńska)); and some information 
about volume (turnover). Interestingly, and this aspect is discussed below (4.2), these 
data are collected and provided by the entrepreneurs who purchase and slaughter pigs; 
by entrepreneurs who owned the abattoirs slaughtering pigs; and/or by entrepreneurs 
producing carcasses, pig meat or processed products. For piglets, prices are collected by 
advisory services and sent to the Ministry. All in all, this information covers about two-
third of total pig slaughtering in Poland, and it is posted on a weekly basis on the website 
of the relevant Ministry. The absence of other information, particularly about costs in the 
intermediate steps of the supply chain, has been a continuing source of complaints. 
Similar dissatisfaction was reported by several participants, e.g., regarding beef or dairy 
milk sectors. 
This absence of data on costs along the different stages so that ‘fairness’ of prices at the 
farm gates or at the end-consumer’s level could be properly assessed is a recurrent 
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complaint in supply chain systems. Looking at data available from Eurostat, 
complemented by information collected by DG-AGRI and some stakeholders (mainly on a 
voluntary basis), Haniotis (3) noticed that information coverage is quite limited, with the 
possible exception of the “Market Dashboards” for fifteen sectors monitored by DG-AGRI. 
These deficiencies would be particularly acute when it comes to input statistics (regarding 
machinery, seeds, etc.) as well as output at the different steps of the supply chains. 
Limitation on information available and its consequences for operators is confirmed by 
observations at a more micro level. For example, Hanrahan (11) pointed out that 
information in the Irish beef market, particularly on physicals, is not only very limited but 
also not well structured, which challenges its usefulness to decision-makers.  
Figure 5, based on a Wageningen ongoing project commissioned by the JCR-EC 
illustrates the limited type of information collected in EU so far. 
Figure 5: Information collected along different stages of supply chains 
 
Source: Gardebroek (12) 
In that respect, Spain and France are exceptions. It has been argued (e.g. Testut-Neves 
et al.6) that the extensive collection of data on costs, following the creation of the French 
observatory on prices and margins in the food chain (Law from 2011), provides 
information that can help managing volatility and build consensus among parties in the 
supply chain system. Looking at the Spanish experience, McCorriston (4) noted that the 
availability of analysis covering price structures for 26 products at farmer, wholesale and 
retail levels and of information on the main factors determining prices has “foster[ed] 
dialogue and collaboration among stakeholders at all stages of the food chain with formal 
meetings and seminars and conferences.” These statements were confirmed by Bicknell 
(10) who pointed out that access to data on production cost is essential for developing 
transparency and mutually beneficial pricing mechanisms. So, more fluidity of markets 
would go hand-in-hand with improved relationships among parties. 
However, extending the set of information collected does not come without drawbacks … 
and costs, all of which needs being assessed in relation to the usefulness of information 
collected (more on this below). In most cases only price levels or indices are reported, 
without much context or explanation, opening door to misinterpretation (Gardebroek, 
12). Collecting data on contexts (e.g., concentration indices, number of stages and 
actors, etc.) may be crucial for appropriate interpretation and, therefore, for market 
transparency. Moreover, available data are often collected via existing channels, e.g. 
statistics office, marketing board, and various agencies, without much coordination and 
with sources not always clear, so that the relevance of data can easily be challenged. In 
most cases, this heterogeneity of sources does not come from intended biases, but 
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corresponds to the different goals that collecting organizations are targeting, the users 
they intend to satisfy, etc. For example, some organizations may focus on providing 
timely information on market prices to farmers, other may intend to deliver information 
to protect consumers against excessively high prices, and still others may primarily 
deliver information that are relevant for policy-making. This heterogeneity can well 
amplify the lack of contextualization needed for appropriate interpretation, generating 
specific obstacles to transparency. Hence 
Message # 3: There is a need for more structural information, going 
beyond the almost exclusive data on prices collected at the farm-gate or 
the end-consumer’s level, particularly when supply chains are the 
prevailing organizations. However, deciding which information should be 
selected to reflect this complexity at reasonable costs requires well-
defined goals, a clear understanding of the context that give sense to this 
information, and a view at the modalities through which data are collected 
… and used.  
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3. SHOULD DATA COLLECTION BE EXTENDED? FOR WHOM? 
Diversifying available data and taking on board the variety of sources that could provide 
new data raise important questions regarding the motivation, cost, and ultimate impact 
of more extensive information on ‘market transparency.’ There has been a propensity 
since Hayek’s paper (1945) to consider data equivalent to information that would 
spontaneously generate knowledge among agents. However, as noted by Arbia et al. 
(13), there are differences between data and information, and between information and 
quality of information. Policy-makers must be aware of the resulting difficulties and 
constraints. Collecting data is not synonymous of providing adequate information. Even 
more importantly, as emphasized by several contributors, information must be delivered 
in a format that allows users to make it relevant for the purpose at stake.  
3.1: Why?  
There was a general agreement among participants to the workshop that more 
information can make the operation of markets more transparent. However, when it 
comes to prioritizing what information would be most valuable to reach that goal, there is 
a significant variety of answers, partially shaped by the motivation of the different parties 
(Lima, 0).  
Brooks (1) emphasized upfront the gains that can be expected from more information on 
prices along the different stages of supply chains. According to his contribution: “1. 
Improved price discovery can raise efficiency, dampen price volatility and reduce waste; 
2. It can redress unequal bargaining power that derives from asymmetric information; 3. 
It can contribute to the identification of price collusion and other anti-competitive 
practices.” 
Partially in line with these arguments but with a different emphasis, promoters of more 
extensive and diversified information, going beyond data on prices, developed three 
series of arguments. (1) Extending the set of information available, particularly in the 
intermediate stages of supply chains, would allow more fluidity in the operation of 
markets; (2) it could help reducing asymmetries in bargaining power, thus levelling the 
playing field among participants to supply chains and, more generally, to markets; (3) It 
could provide important tools to design more relevant economic policies, going beyond 
anti-competitive practices. For example, Russo (15) and Chambolle (5) pointed out the 
gains that could be expected in decision-making and risk management among parties to 
the market as well as among those designing and monitoring agricultural policies.  
However, several contributors also noted potential drawbacks, a challenge to ‘WHY’ 
more extensive information would be needed. These drawbacks can partially explain why 
retailers participating to the public consultation (Lima, 0) and to the discussion in the 
workshop were reluctant to mandatory collection of more information on prices and costs 
throughout the different stages of supply chains. Four points emerged from different 
contributions (e.g., Fausti, 9; Bicknell, 10; Gardebroek, 12; Russo, 15) that particularly 
need careful consideration. First, even if data collection remains focused on prices, such 
information can be misleading since prices are only a subset of the relevant information 
on ‘thin’ markets. As already mentioned in section 2, market structure matters when it 
comes to the reliability, relevance and interpretation of information collected. Second, 
and partially related to this market structure issue, benefits may be unevenly distributed. 
For example, Russo noted that “Transparency benefits for farmers can be small if buyers 
have strong bargaining power under perfect information” (Russo, 15). Third, the quality 
of information collected and made available as well as its diversity matter as much as its 
extension (Arbia et al., 13). For example, extensive data on prices might be of little help 
to farmers or even participants to intermediate stages of the supply chain if strategic 
information about costs is missing (Testut-Neves, 6; Latkowska, 7; Russo, 15) or if 
information is delivered at such an aggregate level that it makes little sense for operators 
at the regional or local level (Arbia et al., 13). Fourth, and this issue generated vigorous 
debates in our workshop, there might be ambiguous effects of more extensive 
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information on transparency and the building of a more competitive environment, for 
example if disclosure facilitates explicit or implicit collusion among the best-informed 
parties, or if making more information available to competitors opens room to more 
concentration. 
The lessons from these intense discussions can be summarized as: 
Message # 4: More extensive and varied information can improve 
transparency and competitiveness, but there is a need to prioritize 
information to be collected. In doing so, motivation must be carefully 
examined. Indeed, externalities coming out of extensive disclosure are 
not well-known. Ideally, it should benefit all parties along the supply 
chain. However, it might also introduce distortions (e.g., collusion, 
concentration). What information is useful, why, and to what party (-ies) 
therefore require careful consideration. 
3.2: For whom?   
Indeed, the intense discussions surrounding these sensitive issues suggested that ‘what’ 
information and ‘why’ it should be more diversified cannot be dissociated from looking at 
the other side of the picture: who shall potentially benefit? This question connects to the 
very important problem of users and usage of information. Too often, statements about 
the virtues of market transparency ignore this issue. However, as pointed out by 
Gardebroek (12), stated objectives of collecting data are often not in line with their 
actual collection, and even more so about their relevance for different categories of 
users. What do we know about who actually use data on food prices and margins? Do 
farmers actually consult available data when making their decisions? Does industry use 
them? Does information serve policy-making and feed research oriented towards 
safeguarding well-functioning markets? 
A brief review of the potential beneficiaries designated in various contributions shows the 
need to pay more attention to this aspect than usually done.  
First, we would expect private agents engaged in transactions to be the main target and 
beneficiaries of more extensive and reliable information. It should be particularly so in 
the context of supply chains, since these organizational arrangements make transactions 
embedded in a sequence of transfer of rights that are very imperfectly captured through 
the standard market signals (prices), a point made by several contributors (e.g., Brooks 
(1), McCorriston (4), Chambolle (5); Bicknell (10), Hanrahan (11), Russo (15)). 
Moreover, understanding and processing information is not evenly distributed among 
parties and can even lead to increase asymmetry in bargaining power. For example, 
Hanrahan (11) emphasized how challenging can be the processing of rich data sets for 
farmers; and Chambolle (5) noted potential biases that may result in the relationship 
between producers and retailers.  
Second, consumers are often assumed to be major beneficiaries of increased market 
transparency. Presentations and debates at the workshop did not pay much attention to 
that aspect, likely sharing this assumption. At the end of the day, we did not make clear 
what type of information is the most relevant and useful for consumers when they have 
to allocate their resources in sorting their consumption basket. Interesting side remarks 
pointed out unexpected beneficiaries on the consumers’ side. For example, Sheats (8) 
noted the usefulness of data available on food price for planners of school lunches! 
However, a quick review of studies on the welfare effects of transparency for consumers 
showed that these studies are constrained by drastically restrictive hypotheses and 
deliver ambiguous results (Russo, 15). Clearly we need more studies on the impact of 
more extensive information on consumers’ choices. 
Third, several contributors and discussants pinpointed that policy-makers might be the 
most extensive users of data collected on agriculture and agri-food businesses. Indeed, 
as well indicated by Haniotis (3) in his overview of market transparency issues in the EU, 
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policy-makers heavily rely on information thus collected when it comes to assessing and 
reorienting existing policies (e.g., CAP reforms), negotiating trade agreements, managing 
and allocating risks when facing sectoral crisis, etc. This important role of information for 
policy-makers was also pointed out in many contributions focusing on specific markets. 
For example, Latkowska (7) refers explicitly to the usefulness of information collected on 
the pig meat sector in Poland when it comes to preparing briefings for the government, 
helping the minister to prepare proposals, etc. But she remains vague, as many other 
participants did, on the usefulness of these data for other potential users, vaguely 
identified as ‘markets participants.’  
These observations suggest another message: 
Message # 5: More attention should be paid to the actual users and usage 
of already available information. When it comes to allocating resources, it 
might be as important to focus on building the capacity to use available 
information as extending the existing information set.   
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4. AT WHAT COST? BY WHOM? 
Deciding to allocate more resources to the collection and diffusion of information raises 
other questions. At what cost can the set of existing information be extended? And who 
could most efficiently collect and process information? Shall it be through public 
organizations? Is it the best way to spend public money? Or should collection of 
information be delegated to private organizations? And how reliable can be this solution? 
Although useful insights were provided during the workshop, these questions clearly 
remain to be explored further.  
4.1: At what cost? 
As Chambolle (5) reminded us, “In decision theory, the expected value of perfect 
information (EVPI) is the price that one would be willing to pay in order to gain access to 
perfect information.” But actors do not live in that perfect world. They live in a world of 
imperfect information in which improving information has a cost that imposes strict 
limitations. The problem is that little is known about the cost of collecting information, 
and even less so about the cost of processing this information in a way that would make 
it easily available and relevant to users. Gardebroek (12) reports a quite unique study, 
commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs (Oosterkamp et al., 2013a,b), 
complemented by an ongoing study at Wageningen University, commissioned by the 
Joint Research Centre of the EC, that intends to approximate the costs of alternative 
solutions chosen by EC members to collect information in the agriculture sector. 
Notwithstanding debates on the precision and relevance of data on which these studies 
are based, there is a trend that clearly suggests that most countries in the EU have 
chosen to collect data at low costs. In the two countries in which more extensive data on 
prices and margins along the supply chains are collected (Spain and France) the 
preliminary results of the Wageningen study reported by Gardebroek suggest that cost is 
significantly higher, on average about one million euros or more depending on the 
extension of the program.  
In the knowledge-based world in which we live, there is a push towards making 
increasingly extended information available in agriculture and the agri-food industry as in 
all other sectors of human activity. But is it worth the price? Does more extensive 
information improve market transparency? And does it have a significant impact on 
efficiency? Answering these questions is not obvious, as illustrated by the debates in the 
workshop. One interesting argument developed by some participants in favour of more 
and better information  is that this could not only help decision-makers (including policy-
makers …and consumers at the end of supply chains), but also play an active role in 
building a common vocabulary among participants to supply chains. Building consensus 
about the information needed and the modalities of its collection could support the 
development of shared view among stakeholders, thus potentially reducing transaction 
costs. Following the presentations by Testut-Neves (6) and Gardebroek (12), who 
suggested that these discussions among parties to collect more extensive information 
could open the way to successful negotiations and consensus, thus lowering transaction 
costs and making markets more efficient, some discussants pointed out that this could 
also leave way to collusion! Whether this strategy to decide and collect information is 
beneficial remains an open question. Hence:  
Message # 6: institutional actors face a dilemma between information not 
detailed enough and/or not updated at adequate speed to be useful to 
decision-makers, and the increasing costs of extending and processing 
the data set in a meaningful way. In making decisions about the resource 
needed to improve market transparency, equilibrium must be found 
between the marginal value of extra data for users versus the costs to be 
passed not only to these users but also to consumers and taxpayers.  
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4.2: By whom? 
One aspect of the cost issue concerns the modalities, and more specifically the 
organization(s) in charge of collecting data and eventually processing them. In the 
European Union, the creation of the Common Agricultural Policy has been accompanied 
by the development of data collected by public authorities, mainly national governments 
or agencies of the European Commission (Haniotis, 3). In the US, there has been the 
long-term role of the Department of Agriculture, and the exceptional set of data (with 
details county by county) accumulated through the Census initiated in 1790 and later 
complemented by the distinct US Census of Agriculture which is held every 5 years.  
However, in both cases (EU and the USA), the picture is actually more complex, with a 
significant share of data collected through of variety of actors: agricultural organizations, 
private firms, etc. A quick inventory by Gardebroek (12) of the different organizations 
and channels through which information is collected in the European Union illustrates the 
diversity of actors involved and the variety of solutions across member states.  
 
Table 1: The diversity of sources of information in the EU 
 
Public actors Associations & lobby 
groups 
Industry & private 
firms 
National level Statistics office 
Ministries 
Price & margin 
observatories  
Farmer associations 
Trader unions 
Supply chain 
associations 
Magazines & 
websites 
Market intelligence 
companies 
Auctions and 
commodity 
exchanges 
Supranational level EU Food price 
monitoring tool 
EU market 
observatories 
Eurostat 
FAO, OECD, World 
Bank 
Farmer associations 
Trader unions (IGC) 
Supply chain 
associations 
Magazines & 
websites 
Market intelligence 
companies 
Commodity 
exchanges 
Source: Gardebroek (12) 
The different organizations involved sometimes work according to national guidelines or 
to meet national goals. However, many operate primarily to satisfy the needs of the 
specific actors financing their activities. Part of this diversity can be explained by the 
variety in the food industry structure across countries, for example the specific 
proportion of specialized vs. part-time farmers, the importance of PDO production, the 
respective role of export vs. domestic markets, the significance of certain products, the 
degree of concentration in processing and retail, etc. Nevertheless, this diversity often 
makes the comparison of data difficult, due to differences in goals, terminology and 
methodology. 
A comparison between France and Spain on the one hand, Germany on the other hand 
illustrates some of these difficulties. France (Testut-Neves, 6) and Spain (McCorriston, 4) 
have initiated observatories collecting extensive information on food price and margin. 
This is done through separate and relatively autonomous public entities collecting, 
analysing and delivering data and providing additional information on supply chains 
through specific studies. An important aspect of the whole process is the involvement of 
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various stakeholders at the different stages of the elaboration and implementation of 
programs to collect information, thus contributing to the reliability of data and playing an 
active role in building consensus on what is the situation for specific sectors at specific 
points in time. The result is the availability of quite detailed information, including about 
supply chains, although with significant delays. By contrast, in Germany sources of 
information, whether public or private, rather provide aggregated data (Gardebroek, 12). 
On the public side, a Federal Institute collects information mainly on global prices and 
volumes, and the statistical office delivers monthly industry and consumer prices for 
agriculture as for all other activities. On the semi-public and private side, specialized 
entities collect more specific information. A major contributor in that respect is AMI, 
which stands for Agrarmarkt Informations, a party with a private status that has as its 
main shareholders agricultural publishing companies and major associations of 
agriculture -e.g. Farmers Union, Union of Agricultural Marketing Cooperatives. AMI 
collects and analyses important quantitative market data such as weighted prices, 
cultivated areas, production and stocks. Other organizations also contribute to data 
collection (e.g., FiBL, which collects information on organic agriculture in five countries 
including Germany). 
These examples and the synthetic table (Table 1) provided by Gardebroek (12) illustrate 
the complex combination of public, private, and hybrid modalities in collecting 
information. These variations partially correspond to the diversity of purposes and 
priorities of the ‘donneurs d’ordre’ (e.g., is the priority the timely delivery of information 
to farmers? the protection of consumers? Instrumenting policy-makers?). A less noble 
motivation might also be budget constraints. As noted by Baffes (2), “Declining budgets 
have “starved” Agencies (e.g., International Organizations, relevant Ministries, as well as 
statistical agencies, both national and international) that could enhance quantity and 
improve quality of information.”   
The example of the US is particularly interesting in that respect since it presents a long-
term mix of public and private reporting, with the active collection of data by public 
entities (mainly through the Census and the Department of Agriculture) as well as private 
ones.   
Regarding the role of public entities, Fausti (9) reviewed the significant evolution of the 
US system over time. According to his presentation, empirical studies suggest that the 
initial Voluntary Price Reporting (VPR) may have been biased, minimizing volatility of 
prices and hampering transparency, while the more recent Mandatory Price Reporting 
(MPR), implemented after 1999, improved price transparency and price discovery. This 
suggests a superior efficiency of mandatory systems, although empirical evidence also 
suggests that market structures matter when it comes to the reliability of reporting in 
both cases. For example, it was mentioned that packers’ ability to exert oligopsonies’ 
power has increased under MPR, leading to potentially less transparency. This 
observation also concur with the issue already raised above: in certain conditions, can 
transparency have a negative impact, favouring a more concentrated and less 
competitive market structure?   
Sheats (8) confirmed this concern. According to his analysis, part of the problem in the 
initial VPR is that it was based on cash or negotiated transactions, with price determined 
through buyer-seller interactions, mostly in public auction venues. Over time, these 
negotiations moved from the public arena to private agreements between buyer and 
seller conducted at the point of production – direct marketing. This evolution, also 
observable in other contexts, made it increasingly difficult to conduct price discovery. In 
the late 1990s, at the time of the so-called “hogs’ crisis”, about 70 percent of hogs were 
procured through alternative marketing arrangements at prices not available to the 
voluntary USDA market reporting program. A similar situation existed in other livestock 
and meat markets. The 1999 legislation adopted by the US Congress intended to change 
this situation and to increase livestock market transparency, making price reporting 
mandatoryfor livestock transactions (later extended to other segments of the meat 
market (e.g., lamb). However, the new reporting system depends largely on packers, 
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importers, and companies slaughtering a significant number of animals. The increasing 
consolidation and vertical integration among these actors and the accompanying 
confidentiality requirements is hampering the ability and willingness of these companies 
to publish data. 
A similar conclusion was reached by Baffes (2) in his short review of the role of Price 
Reporting Agencies. These agencies have mostly developed in the energy and metals 
sectors and not that much in agriculture if one excludes the role of USDA which is not 
really a PRA. Baffes discussed the problem of index accuracy in PRA, which mainly 
“originate from the information PRAs receive from the commodity trading companies.” As 
a result, the reliability of information collected through PRA depends on market 
structures: in cases of small numbers (concentration), there are high risks of biases, as 
so well illustrated by the Georgia Dock Index for chicken, which is reported to have 
biased, even trafficked data for years.  
Message # 7: There is not one single way to collect information. However, 
transparency requires that the methodology used by different 
organizations to collect and process information be available to the public 
(actors, researchers, policy-makers), with participation of stakeholders 
as a way to reach that goal and limit the potentially negative impact on 
competition. When it comes to collection of information through private 
entities, market concentration is a major concern. 
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5. WHAT IMPACT? 
The main argument for improving information relies on the expectation of positive 
externalities from more transparency. To support this argument, there is the need to 
assess the impact more transparency (or the lack of transparency) can have on markets, 
their efficiency, and in last resort on the well-being of participants to the supply chains, 
from farmers to end-consumers. The general wisdom is that expected benefits are “--For 
private agents: to improve efficiency and equity; --For public policy: to guide policies 
that can foster a competitive, innovative, sustainable and resilient food system” (Brooks, 
1). However, we have already mentioned participants who pointed out the possibility of 
negative externalities from more transparency (e.g., facilitating collusion, favouring 
concentration). Several empirical studies reported in the workshop (McCorriston, 4; 
Russo, 15) also suggested that the impact of more transparency on market structure 
and/or on price paid by consumers is not always what was expected. The only convincing 
answer to these doubts would be to better understand the conditions under which 
drawbacks develop and to better assess the positive as well as negative effects of more 
transparency at the empirical level. Studies are still very short in that respect (Russo, 
15). However, interesting elements were pinpointed by several participants. 
5.1: Direct Impact  
In her contribution, Chambolle (5) focused the attention on the impact of more 
transparency on prices in the relationships between producers and retailers. In doing so, 
she pointed out upfront that the bright side is not without dark effects. On the bright 
side, we expect improved information and better disclosure to increase market efficiency 
by reducing uncertainty in the decision-making process and reducing asymmetry among 
parties to a transaction. However, transparency can also carry inefficiencies: it may well 
restrict the exercise of competition (static effect) and increase the risk of collusion 
(dynamic effect). Using as “natural experiment” a French Law (LME) adopted in 2008, 
which restored the negotiability of tariffs and authorized price discrimination under 
conditions of disclosure, Chambolle and her co-authors (M.L. Allain and S. Turolla) 
assessed empirically the effects of this institutional change on prices for National Brands 
and Private Labels for 173 categories of products. The main observable effect has been a 
small decrease in price for 82 % of all 173 products over a two years period after the 
adoption of the law, and a small decrease in price (2.33 %) for National Brands in 
comparison to Private Labels, with no clear conclusion on the profit-sharing effect and on 
the possible correlation between price decrease and changes in the market structure. 
However, a significant concentration can be observed at the buying level, with the 
creation of large buying groups ending up in a very high concentration ratio (CR4) of 
92.5 %. She concluded, referring to a recent study by the French Competition Authority 
(“Avis no. 18-A-04 du 3 mai 2018 relatif au secteur agricole") that “Detailed information 
about transactions and prices at the individual level might have anti-competitive effects”. 
This is particularly the case in situations in which information on individual transactions is 
made public; less so when price information is aggregated and/or disseminated, although 
with delays that can be significant. 
A more qualitative synthesis provided by McCorriston (4) about the possible impact of 
disclosure –mainly on prices - similarly pointed out ambiguous effects, leading to the 
conclusion that “the provision of public information does not necessarily increase 
welfare”. Among other factors, and referring to Morris and Shin (2002) he noted that 
when private agents already have relatively precise aggregated information, public 
information can be harmful insofar as private agents can over-react to the public signal. 
He also emphasized ambiguous effects at the micro level. Referring to several empirical 
studies (the case of gasoline, with diverging results of price disclosure depending on the 
institutional environment; the case of livestock meat in the US, with the impact of 
disclosure differing according to the market structure; the case of cement in Denmark, 
where disclosure weakened competition and translated into substantial price increase), 
he noted that disclosure may lower search costs (static effect) but may also facilitate 
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coordination across firms, actually feeding collusion and pushing prices upward (dynamic 
effect). However, McCorriston also referred to another and more extensive study (Ater 
and Rigbi, 2017) that concludes otherwise. Following a change in regulation that made 
price disclosure in the Israeli supermarket industry compulsory, these authors examined 
the impact on all products sold in supermarkets, thus going beyond the impact of 
disclosure on prices of a single sector, as in the cases mentioned above. The main insight 
of this study is that both prices and price dispersion fell following price disclosure. 
Figure 6: Potential impact of price disclosure 
 
Source: Ater & Rigbi (2017), quoted in McCorriston (4) 
McCorriston (4) also summarized some lessons from studies on the impact of price 
disclosure on farmers and farmers’ market. The key idea behind the endorsement of 
many mandatory information reporting programs is that they would help small farmers to 
better compete in an increasingly concentrated sector. However, this impact is limited: 
while information at farm gates and at end-consumers’ level is generally available in 
developed countries, what is going on in intermediate segments along the supply chain, 
from producers to groceries, remains much more ‘obscure’. Referring to data collected by 
the OECD, he emphasized that getting information on price transmission along the supply 
chain –mainly at the stages involving food processors and retailers- in order to better 
deal with Unfair Trading Practices is considered a top priority in all countries surveyed, a 
demand confirmed by the public consultation opened by the DG-AGRI in prevision of our 
workshop (Lima, 0).  
The negative impact of lack of transparency along the supply chain has also been pointed 
out by other contributors and many discussants. For example, Hanrahan (11) reported 
the ongoing tensions between Irish farmers, meat companies, and retailers about the 
deficit of information on margins along the supply chain. The ‘volume’ of information 
available declines quite significantly when going down the supply chain, with very little 
data available at meat processing/wholesale and retail market levels. In his discussion of 
this issue, often at the core of controversies regarding the sources of unfair trading 
practices, he raised a crucial question: could the absence/low level of trust along the 
Irish beef supply chain be improved with more information on margins in the meat 
processing industry and more information on farmer/processor shares of the beef export? 
This question relates to a more general issue: what is the possible impact of more 
transparency on the behaviour of agents? Bicknell (10) argued that disclosure in the UK 
of wholesale prices and average farm gate prices showed they evolve closely to each 
other, with a delay of adjustment of about 3 months at the farm gate. As a result, it 
made it difficult for farmers to claim they have been squeezed, thus making smoother 
their relationship to other parties in the supply chain. Differently but in a similar vein, 
Testut-Neves (6) and several participants pointed out that the collection of more 
extensive information and the involvement of stakeholders in that process can facilitate 
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the development of common knowledge that ease negotiations among parties, thus 
lowering transaction costs in the long run. 
Another issue that remained open throughout the workshop is the potential impact of 
more information and more extensive disclosure on consumers’ behavior. Surprisingly, 
this aspect was not much discussed, maybe because there was an underlying assumption 
that consumers would automatically benefit from more extensive and better diffused 
information. However, beside the possibility of biases or distortions that disclosure could 
introduce on market structures, with potentially negative effects on prices paid, there is 
also the need to take into account the limited capacity of consumers to efficiently process 
denser information. Bounded rationality is key issue here, although this was not 
discussed in our workshop.  
Message # 8: More transparency implemented through extensive 
information and disclosure does not in itself automatically overcome 
effects coming from other market imperfections (e.g., market power). It 
does not automatically generate win-win outcomes. Under certain 
conditions, transparency and extensive disclosure might even produce 
negative effects. Extending standards of transparency and disclosure of 
information is beneficial but must be tempered by taking into account its 
effect on market structures and on agents’ behaviour.  
5.2: What impact can have new technologies? 
One question that emerged from our workshop was whether the development of new 
technologies and related means of communication could impact conditions of 
transparency, and ultimately the very organization of markets. This impact could come 
from more information available at a lower cost and/or from new means to compete. It is 
already obvious that internet has considerably increased the volume of information 
available as well as access to that information, with a strong impact on the behaviour of 
agents at all stages of the supply chains. Two contributions looked at more recent 
changes that could amplify this impact. 
Arbia et al. (13) suggested that using new technologies may have a major effect on the 
volume and, above all, on the quality of information collected and its availability to final 
users. The central point they made is that enhancing the quality of information might 
have a much bigger impact than simply extending the set of information available and 
that new technologies allow major push in this direction. They illustrate through the 
example of spatial data. Indeed, data aggregated at the national level often misrepresent 
the actual information, often regional or even local, that matters most to users.  Using 
data about food prices exchanged among citizens (farmers, food traders, consumers) 
through their mobile telephones, they initiated an experiment in ‘crowdsourcing,’ drawing 
a detailed spatial map of maize price traded in several locations of Nigeria. Although 
aware of the possible biases coming out of the self-selection process involved in the way 
data were collected, on a voluntary basis, these contributors argue that this ‘spatial’ 
methodology allows the production of timely and reliable price data. Statistical inference 
would be facilitated as well as overall quality assessment, improving the global quality of 
data and, above all, making them much more relevant to users. 
Beside quality and availability, two problems repeatedly raised by contributors and 
participants to the workshop are (1) the lack of information along the supply chain; and 
(2) the speed at which information is available. In an exploratory paper, Ciaian (14) 
examined the possibilities opened by the introduction of blockchains to face these 
problems. Experiments are already on their way in agriculture and the agri-business 
(e.g., a ‘fairchain’ coffee brand, the development of ‘olivacoins’ for olive oil, the tracking 
of the provenance of turkey products, the experimental collaboration between IBM and 
Walmart to trace the origin of pork from China and mangos from Mexico, etc.). 
Advantages of blockchains come from their capacity to register all transactions and to 
store their entire history, allowing full and near real time access to transactions and 
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tracking information beyond prices at all stages in the supply chain, and at low costs 
thanks to the elimination of intermediaries. So, is the future of market transparency 
embedded in blockchains? Ciaian pointed out the many challenges this solution still faces, 
among them: a) the digital signature that must be associated to all physical 
characteristics of products to be traded; b) The slowness of blockchains in processing 
transactions (for the time being they can process 10 transactions per second; Visa, for 
example, can process between 5,000 and 8,000 transactions per second); c) The need 
for technological developments that would allow connecting different blockchains; d) the 
required network effect (collaboration of all parties) on which blockchains depend; e) The 
risk of collusion, which cannot be underestimated; f) and above all the key issue of 
Cybersecurity. Besides these relatively technical challenges, there is also the more 
general societal impact, going far beyond agriculture, that blockchains may represent for 
millions of intermediaries, for existing regulation, and for the tight institutional 
harmonization it would require across countries.  
Message # 9: Although they still remain at the experiment stage, 
prospects opened by the use of new technologies and transformation of 
their usage suggest potential for collecting and diffusing huge quantity of 
information previously not available or hardly accessible.  The question of 
their impact on the organization of the sector and the behaviour of 
agents involved remains a major issue to be explored.  
5.3: How to diffuse information? How to use it? 
However, this potential abundance of data may as well amplify existing problems about 
their usage. On the one hand, proliferation is not synonymous of reliability! Data need to 
be checked, transformed into manageable information, and processed appropriately in 
order to become knowledge. On the other hand, even if these steps are properly 
satisfied, the question remains of what users do with this information. Usage is a very 
central issue with respect to transparency, and would likely have deserved more 
extensive consideration in the workshop. Nevertheless, important insights were provided 
by several participants. 
As pointed out by Sheats (8), “One of the greatest challenges created by Livestock 
Mandatory Reporting is the overwhelming amount of market data it provides – far more 
than most non-market analysts can absorb or understand.” The example of the ‘livestock 
dashboards’ developed by USDA and that partially rely on new technologies of 
communication Illustrates the problem. Dashboards were introduced to make data more 
accessible, more rapidly, and more easily to parties to transactions. However, Sheats 
rightly emphasized that most producers lack the knowledge necessary to process this 
complex information and the basic understanding of the usage of meat prices to price live 
animals. 
Processing data to make them useful is already very time-consuming, which might be 
dissuasive to users. In principle, websites allowing price comparison should help lowering 
search costs, thus favouring lower prices (McCorriston, 4). And they do so for many 
products and services, as we all know as consumers. However, all of us have also 
experienced the difficulty and time spent in identifying relevant sites and interpreting 
correctly the data they provide. As pointed out by Stigler long before the internet 
revolution (Stigler, 1961), most of the time search costs prevent reaching the optimal 
solution! Moreover, because information that needs being collected and processed along 
supply chains is complex, timing of delivery is a major issue. As noted by Gardebroek 
(12), referring to Oosterkamp et al. (2013) and their estimation of the French and 
Spanish observatories, the time needed to report prices and margins along supply chains 
challenges their usefulness for decision-makers. Indeed, notwithstanding the legitimate 
debate about methodology in use, a major difficulty might well be the delays in making 
relevant data available. And one could add another difficulty, imposed by the limited 
human capacity to use available information, whatever its richness, to make decisions 
(the problem of bounded rationality, raised by Herbert Simon decades ago –see Simon, 
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1957, 1979). New technologies may help solving the first problem, speeding up the 
collection and processing of data; there is no indication that they could solve the second 
problem!  
In a sense, these difficulties can be related to the issue of costs, discussed in section 4.1. 
Baffes (2) suggested that when decisions must be made about extending the information 
set and investing in its disclosure, it might be relevant to look at their “rate of return.” 
Taking a controversial position, he argued that the rate of return of increased accuracy 
tends to be relatively low compared to the rate of return from the diffusion of basic 
information in high profile news outlets.  
Message # 10: When considering extension and increased reliability of 
information as means to improve transparency, the limited capacity of 
users to process that information must be kept in mind. In that respect, 
the rate of return of resources spent on diffusing available information 
and informing/training users to take advantage of it might be higher than 
continuously extending the data set. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
‘Market transparency’ is a challenging issue. It is so with respect to its content, the 
modalities of its implementation, and its impact. As noted by McCorriston (4): “Both 
theory and emerging evidence suggests this issue is not clear-cut: It is a challenge to 
standard assumptions about the benefits that transparency would bring…there are 
potential downsides associated with greater transparency, even if there are gains, they 
should/could be quantified.” The workshop helped identifying aspects in which improved 
transparency provide strong support to market efficiency, but also pinpointed important 
loopholes and potential drawbacks. 
6.1: Black holes in transparency 
Several contributors and discussants rightly emphasized the significant knowledge that 
public institutions and private organizations of the EU have accumulated about structures 
of agri-food markets and prices, especially at the farm and consumers’ levels. 
However, even sticking to the standard view of price as the key variable to inform 
market transparency and rational choices, substantial black holes remain regarding 
knowledge of price formation and transmission, particularly along the intermediate 
stages of supply chains. McCorriston (4) summarized this issue in the following figure:  
Figure 7: Problems of price transparency alongsupply chains  
ConsumersRetailing
Food 
Processing Agriculture
Price Transmission
(Extent, nature, reasons, 
differences)
Where Do Price Transparency Issues Arise?
Price Dispersion
Price Formation: How are prices linked between stages?
How do retailers compete?
Vertical restraints, 
vertical coordination (PLs)
How do processors compete?
Pricing, contracts of
different forms, UTPs
‘Low’ prices, price dispersion
and terms of contracts
 
Source: McCorriston (4) 
There was a general agreement in the workshop as well as in the public consultation 
opened by DG-AGRI (Lima, 0) that further exploration of these black holes and improved 
information about prices in intermediate stages of supply chains are needed to increase 
transparency. However, this view had its challengers. Sceptics pointed out the cost of 
extending the existing data set and processing the information thus acquired, with a 
possible low ‘rate of return’. Also, numerous participants took note of the possibility of a 
negative impact of extensive disclosure on competitiveness. In their view, and they 
referred to empirical studies supporting their concern, there are conditions under which 
‘transparency’ of transactions may generate effects opposite to the expected ones, e.g., 
favouring collusion and concentration.  
(1) A challenging lesson from the workshop is therefore that if there is a 
need for increased price transparency, particularly at the intermediate 
levels of the supply chain, its impact on competitiveness and efficiency 
needs to be cautiously assessed. 
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6.2: Challenges related to non-price dimension: market structure 
There was also a general agreement, in line with the analysis submitted by the 
Agricultural Markets Task Force in its report (2016) that transparency cannot be limited 
to price disclosure at the farm gate or the end-consumer level, or even to information 
about characteristics of products. Most participants emphasized that transparency 
requires combining knowledge on the structuration of supply chains as well as on price 
formation and transmission along these chains, taking into account the important variety 
of situations in different sectors and countries. 
Haniotis (3) emphasized upfront that beyond the already extensive information available 
there are possible developments that could benefit transparency. Upstream, decision-
makers would be better-off with a better knowledge of cost changes that can impact 
competitiveness and productivity; of long-term changes in trend; and of technological 
shifts. Downstream, all parties to the supply chain, including consumers, could benefit 
from a better break-down of value added at different stages of transformation; from 
more detailed data on price transmission, available with shorter delays; and from 
information going beyond standard products to better capture quality differentiation. 
One lesson from other contributions in the same direction is that there is the need to 
know how markets are actually organized and monitored. Brooks (1) noted the gap 
between agricultural markets, for which extensive data are now publicly available, and 
food markets that remain rather opaque. Referring to the case of dairy milk in the UK, 
Bicknell (10) pointed out that the control over more than 50% of the milk available in 
Britain by two dairy buyers does not facilitate transparency, or the perception of market 
transparency! Similarly, Hanrahan (11) noted that cattle farming, the leading agricultural 
activity with dairy in Ireland is dominated by four privately owned multi-plant firms. And 
Chambolle indicated the high concentration of retailing in France, with a CR4 of 92.5 %. 
As wrapped up by Bicknell (10), high concentration raises “Problems with the balance of 
bargaining power (Examples of unfair or unclear contract terms) [that] generate a lack of 
trust and transparency that discourages good relationships across the supply chain.” And 
Brooks (1) supported this view, noting that if the collection and diffusion of information 
on prices on both sides of transactions is relatively extensive in all OECD countries, the 
development of oligopolistic markets is an important challenge to transparency, making 
the effects of price disclosure more ambiguous, a point also made by Sheats (8) and 
Fausti (9) for the US. 
(2) Another lesson from the workshop is therefore that transparency 
requires better knowledge of market structures in order to create a levelled 
field among parties to transactions. However, the variety and complexity of 
supply chain systems may require differentiated policies regarding the 
collection of more extensive information.  
More or less explicitly, there was the idea that a better knowledge of market structure 
according to different sectors may command different strategies in the collection of 
information, with special attention paid to critical sectors (e.g., meat, dairy products). 
However, is such information-oriented strategy conceivable without introducing 
discrimination among parties to transactions?  
6.3: Final remarks 
There is already significant information on agriculture and agri-business available among 
the member states of EU. The development of Big Data may just add much more 
information … and more complexity in processing that information. There are at least two 
problems involved that were discussed in the workshop: (1) How to overcome the 
disparity of these sources of information and make it accessible to users? (2) How to 
make this huge quantity of information formatted in a way that is useful for parties 
involved in specific transactions?  
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The first question very much relates to the supply side of market transparency. It has 
occupied a central place in the presentations and discussions of the workshop. Several 
contributions focused the attention on what information is already available or should be 
produced, at what costs, with what impact. In that context, there were quite intense 
debates about the costs of collecting more information (Brooks, 1; Gardebroek, 12) and 
even more controversial views about the impact of extensive disclosure. Chambolle (5) 
contrasted the ‘bright side’ and the ‘dark side’ of extensive disclosure of already existing 
information, while Brooks (1) and McCorriston (4) pointed out less obvious effects of 
extensive information that make them difficult to capture, e.g., facilitating imitation thus 
reducing differentiation and possibly innovation. In all cases, the underlying problem 
could be related to an observation made by Kenneth Arrow quite a while ago (Arrow, 
1974): there is a trade-off between the benefits of collecting and diffusing more 
information, and the risk of negative impact on competition since once information is 
diffused it becomes available to competitors, thus potentially reducing competition. This 
effect may partially explain the reluctance to mandatory delivery of information 
expressed by some parties in the public consultation of the DG-AGRI (Lima, 0) as well as 
by some participants to the workshop, particularly retailers. 
The second question relates to the demand side. What would be the usage of more 
information? To what purpose? Although pinpointed in some contributions, these 
questions may not have been addressed with the attention they deserve. As rightly 
noticed by Brooks (1), “Data can be misused and misinterpreted – but that is no reason 
not to collect data.” However, the problem may go much deeper and concern the 
usefulness of information already available and, more importantly, the capacity of users 
to fruitfully use that information. As suggested by some participants, although not that 
many, a key issue might be the capacity of users to process available information in a 
way that would allow them to make better decision and to be in a better position in 
negotiating transactions. 
(3) One more lesson could then be to have more resources for training 
parties to better understand and make more intense and better usage of 
information available, rather than focusing on the extension of the set of 
information.  
The example developed by Arbia et al. (13) regarding the use of new technologies to 
collect and provide rapidly information that might actually be useful to all users, including 
consumers, suggests a path to be explored in that perspective. Another way to look at 
the same issue could be by revisiting the way information is collected.  
(4) Associating participants to the supply chain, from farmers all the way 
down to consumers, to the definition and implementation of the type of 
information to be collected, processed, and diffused might be an efficient 
way to improve usefulness of information, to build trust among participants 
to supply chains, and to increase confidence in market mechanisms among 
consumers, thus lowering transaction costs. 
However, as it is almost always the case with societal issues, there are drawbacks to 
such strategy, e.g., the risk of facilitating collusion. Once more, assessing costs and 
benefits goes beyond a purely economic approach. 
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